Some stimuli can orient attentional resources and access awareness even if they appear outside the focus of voluntary attention. Stimuli with low-level perceptual salience and stimuli with an emotional content can modulate attention independently of voluntary processes. In Experiment 1, we used a spatial cuing task to investigate whether stimuli that are controlled for their perceptual salience can modulate the rapid orienting of attention based exclusively on their affective relevance. Affective relevance was manipulated through a Pavlovian conditioning paradigm in which an arbitrary and affectively neutral perceptual stimulus was associated with a primary reward (i.e., a chocolate odor). Results revealed that, after conditioning, attentional resources were rapidly oriented toward the stimulus that was previously associated with the reward. In Experiment 2, we used the very same conditioning procedure, but we devaluated the reward after conditioning for half of the participants through a sensory-specific satiation procedure. Strikingly, when the reward was devaluated, attention was no longer oriented toward reward-associated stimuli. Our findings therefore suggest that reward associations rapidly modulate visual processing independently of both voluntary processing and the perceptual salience of the stimulus. This supports the notion that stimuli associated with primary rewards modulate rapid attention orienting on the basis of the affective relevance of the stimulus.
Introduction
When we concentrate on a task, we are still able to process information appearing outside our voluntary attentional focus. For instance, when we read a book in a noisy cafeteria, we do not process all the chatter of the people sitting around us; however, if a baby starts crying, we stop reading and reallocate our attentional resources toward the baby's location. This kind of stimuli can involuntary orient our attentional resources because (a) they have low-level perceptual properties that are salient (e.g., Theeuwes, 1991) and (b) they have emotional content (e.g., Vuilleumier, 2005) .
Despite a large amount of evidence (see, e.g., Yiend, 2009, for a review) consistently demonstrating that attention is involuntarily orientated toward emotional stimuli, to date there has been little agreement on which properties allow emotional stimuli to have this privileged attentional status (Brosch, Pourtois, & Sander, 2010) . Some authors claim that emotional stimuli can orient attentional resources if they have intrinsic properties that represent a threat to the organism survival (Flykt, 2006) . Appraisal theories propose an alternative explanation. According to these theories, it is not the intrinsic property of the stimulus itself that matters, but rather the interaction between 0010-0277/$ -see front matter Ó 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2013.12.002 q This research was supported by the National Center of Competence in Research (NCCR) for the Affective Sciences, financed by a grant from the Swiss National Science Foundation (51NF40-104897), hosted by the University of Geneva, and was also supported by a research grant from Firmenich, SA, to David Sander and Patrik Vuilleumier.
